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Abstract: Using a firm-level survey database covering 48 countries, we investigate how financial 
and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms.  Our database is not 
limited to large firms, but includes small and medium firms and data on a broad spectrum of 
financing sources, including leasing, supplier, development and informal finance.  Small firms 
and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially bank finance. 
Protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of 
large firms, mainly due to its effect on bank finance. Small firms do not use disproportionately 
more leasing or trade finance compared to larger firms, so these financing sources do not 
compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms.  We also find that larger firms 
more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms.  Finally, we 
find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries.  
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 1. Introduction 
Recent papers studying financing patterns around the world emphasize the 
importance of institutional differences across countries  on capital structure (Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001; 
and Fan, Titman, and Twite, 2003). A related literature  has also shown that access to 
external financing is shaped by the country’s legal and financial environment (La  Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998;  and Rajan and Zingales, 1998).1 A direct implication of these studies is that, in 
countries with weak legal systems, and consequently, weak financial systems, firms 
obtain less external financing which results in lower growth. 
Due to data limitations, empirical results in the existing literature are based on 
analysis of the largest, and perhaps unrepresentative, firms across countries. Also, the 
definitions of external financing used in these studies focus on equity and external debt, 
and they do not take into account the possibility that in some countries firms could 
substitute other forms of financing, such as supplier credit or government financing.  
In this paper we investigate whether the financing patterns of small firms differ 
from those of the large firms that have been the focus of the prior literature.  We also 
explore the relation between firms’ external financing and a country’s financial and legal 
institutions and consider a broader spectrum of external financing sources that are likely 
to be more relevant for smaller firms. Finally, we assess whether the relation between 
                                                
1 Carlin and Mayer (2003) argue that a relation exists between a country’s financial system and the 
characteristics of industries that prosper in that country. The importance of institutional development for 
investment is demonstrated by Wurgler (2000) and Love (2003), who show that the flow of capital to good 
investment projects increases with financial development. At the macro level, King and Levine (1993), 
Levine and Zervos (1998), and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) show that financial development 
promotes growth and that differences in legal origins explain differences in financial development.  
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firms’ financing patterns and firm size varies across different levels of financial and 
institutional development and if this varies with the level of financing constraints.  
Better understanding the financing patterns of small firms and how they change 
with institutional development has important policy and resource implications.  Many 
policymakers in governmental and international aid organizations believe that small firms 
have inadequate access to external finance in developing countries as a result of market 
imperfections.  In response, significant resources are being channeled into the promotion  
and financing of  small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries.  
For example, the World Bank Group lends more than $2 billion a year in SME support 
programs.2   Significant renewed interest has also emerged in development banks, which 
seek to provide loans that promote development by lending to constrained borrowers in 
developing countries, particularly small firms. Understanding how financing patterns of 
small firms differ in different institutional environments is an important first step in 
assessing these costly policies.  
We address these issues using a firm level data source, the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), a major cross-sectional firm survey conducted in 
developed and developing countries in 1999 and led by the World Bank.  The survey has 
information on financing choices for close to three thousand firms in 48 countries.3 One 
of the important strengths of the survey is its coverage of small and medium enterprises 
(80% of the observations are from small and medium firms).  Another advantage of the 
                                                
2 The World Bank provides direct and indirect support to SMEs (see World Bank Group Review of Small 
Business Activities, 2002).  In terms of activities, 80% of World Bank programs involve direct financial 
assistance to SMEs, while the remaining 20% involve indirect support such as technical assistance for 
SMEs and for institutions that support SME development. 
3 A detailed discussion of the database is provided in Section 2. Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2006), 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004, 2005) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic 
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WBES is that it includes information on sources of financing that are often associated 
with small-firm finance such as leasing, trade credit, and finance from government and 
informal sources.  Finally, the survey includes an indicator of the extent to which firms 
consider themselves financially constrained.  This allows us to identify constrained firms 
without having to rely on proxies based on accounting data.  
Our results show that, even after we control for various firm characteristics and 
country and institutional variables, smaller firms finance a lower proportion of their 
investment externally, particularly because they make use of bank finance to a lesser 
extent. Further, small firms’ financing constraints are not as strongly associated with 
external finance, suggesting that they are less likely and able to expand external financing 
as they become more financially constrained compared with large firms. Investigating the 
linkages between firm size and the impact of institutional development on financing 
patterns, we see that small firms benefit disproportionally from higher levels of property 
rights protection by using significantly more external finance, particularly from banks. 
These results underline the importance of improving the institutional environment for 
increasing the access of small firms to external finance.   
We would expect that small firms, facing informational asymmetries in financial 
markets, would substitute subsidized financing from government and financing from 
sources that rely on personal or commercial relations, such as trade credit or informal 
finance. We would also expect that such sources would be more significant in countries 
with poorly functioning financial systems or weak property rights protection. 4 
                                                                                                                                            
(2006) also use this data set.  See Graham and Harvey (2001) for a recent application of the survey 
methodology to corporate finance. 
4 Biais and Gollier (1997) and Frank and Maksimovic (2001) argue that trade credit relaxes the borrowing 
constraints caused by asymmetries of information and costly bankruptcy proceedings. As a result, we 
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Our findings only partially confirm the prior finding that small firms substitute 
bank finance with other sources of external finance, especially in countries with 
underdeveloped institutions and financial markets.  We do find that small firms use 
significantly more informal finance than large firms. However, financing from such 
sources is limited.  On average the proportion of investment financed using informal 
finance is less than 2%. Thus, the use of informal financing does little to relax financial 
constraints faced by small firms in developing economies.  Moreover, we find that small 
firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger 
firms.  In particular, financing from leasing does not fill the financing gap of small firms 
in countries with underdeveloped institutions because the use of leasing finance is 
positively associated with the development of financial institutions and equity markets.  
Surprisingly, small firms also do not finance their investment significantly more from 
government sources or development banks despite the fact that such programs are often 
politically justified as increasing financing for small firms.  On the contrary, the 
coefficient is often negative and significant in some specifications.  Overall, these 
findings point out the limits to small firms’ ability to compensate for the 
underdevelopment of their countries’ financial and legal systems.  In these countries, the 
alternative sources of finance either do not significantly fill the gap or, in the case of 
trade credit, are less prevalent. 
While our data do not allow a rigorous testing of the pecking order theory, we 
also provide some insights into this debate.  We find a negative relation between the 
proportion of firms in a country that report being financially constrained and the 
                                                                                                                                            
would expect trade credit to be a substitute for bank lending to small firms in countries with poor financial 
and legal systems. 
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proportion of firms that issue equity. This finding is consistent with the pecking order 
theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) and suggests that the majority of firms become 
constrained before they issue equity. 
 
2. Financing patterns across the world 
A number of studies have focused on cross-country comparisons of financing 
patterns.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) explore capital structure decisions of firms in seven 
developed countries and find that variables commonly used to explain financial structure 
in the US are also correlated with leverage in their sample of international firms.  Booth, 
Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) consider financing choices in a 
sample of ten developing countries and also show that financing decisions are affected by 
the same variables as in developed countries.   However, they also note large fixed effects 
across countries, indicating that specific country factors are at work.  Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) conclude that much remains to be done to 
understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure.  Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) examine capital structure in 30 developed and developing 
countries and show that differences in financing patterns are mostly due to the differences 
in the development of stock markets and banks, as well as differences in the underlying 
legal infrastructure.  Fan, Titman, and Twite (2003) study capital structure in 39 countries 
and confirm earlier findings that institutional differences between countries are much 
more important in determining capital structure choices of firms compared with other 
factors, such as industry affiliation.   
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In a related literature, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) both show a relation among the development of financial institutions, 
external financing, and firm performance.  Taken together, the implication of these 
studies is that a country’s institutions affect financing patterns, with direct implications 
on their performance and growth. 
All these studies rely on databases of listed firms so that even the small firms in 
their samples are relatively large.5  The studies also implicitly define external finance 
narrowly, focusing on equity finance or long-term debt. Theory suggests that firms in 
countries with strong legal systems, in which property rights and in particular the rights 
of investors are enforced, are likely to rely on these types of external finance. In countries 
with weaker property rights protection, we would expect substitute forms of external 
finance, such as informal and supplier credit or development bank financing, to be used.  
Thus, a narrow definition of external financing that does not take into account other 
forms of financing might overstate both the constraints on external financing available to 
firms in less developed countries and the importance of legal development for the 
financing of firms in these countries.6 Also, while these sources are not normally 
included in the US studies of external financing, variations in leasing, supplier, and 
government financing could be important when assessing differences in countries’ 
                                                
5 Papers looking at industry-level growth rates, such as Rajan and Zingales (1998), include firms of all sizes 
but do not distinguish between large and small firms as they are aggregated into industry data. 
6 In some countries, these informal financial systems are prevalent and economically significant. For 
example the amount of foreign transfers through the [informal] hawala system in Pakistan, estimated by the 
minister of finance to be between  $2 billion to $5 billion annually, exceeds the amount transferred through 
the country's banking system (New York Times, 2001).  See also Schramm and Taube (2003). 
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financial systems.7 Looking at all available sources of external finance is especially 
important when studying financing choices of small firms as we do in this paper.   
We use firm-level survey data to investigate the proportion of investment firms 
finance externally, focusing on the differences between small and large firms.  We 
investigate individual sources of finance, such as debt finance and equity, and other 
available sources such as leasing, supplier, government, and informal finance.  The firm-
level data are from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES).   Information on 
financing patterns is available for nearly three thousand firms in 48 countries.8   
 An important strength of the survey is its wide coverage of small and medium 
firms. The survey covers three groups of firms.  Small firms are defined as those with 
five to 50 employees, medium firms are those that employ 51 to five hundred employees, 
and large firms are those that employ more than five hundred employees.  Forty percent 
of our observations are from small firms, another 40% are from medium firms, and the 
remaining 20% are from large firms.  The sample is size-stratified for each country and 
an effort is made to focus on small and medium firms.   Thus, the survey data have a 
selection bias because respondents are not necessarily a representative sample of firms 
from their countries.   However, analysis of mostly smaller firms does represent a nice 
complement to earlier cross-country studies in the literature, which all inevitably include 
a similar, but opposite, selection bias by focusing on the largest firms in their samples of 
diverse countries.  Table A1 in the Appendix reports the number of firms for each 
country and for each size group in the sample.   
                                                
7 Frank and Maksimovic (2001) argue that the equilibrium amount of trade finance relative to bank and 
equity financing is influenced by a country’s legal and financial system. See Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001) for cross country evidence. 
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The survey data have several shortcomings. While they provide information on 
complete financing patterns, financial information is limited.9  Financing patterns are 
given in terms of proportions of investment, not as debt to asset ratios, as is common in 
the previous literature.  Furthermore, we do not have a complete set of firm level 
variables to replicate the usual set of firm-level controls used in capital structure papers, 
particularly profitability of firms.  However, we do have information on firm 
employment, sales, industry, growth, ownership, and whether the firm is an exporter or 
has been receiving subsidies from national or local authorities.  In particular, we have 
information on how important firms consider financing obstacles to be in affecting the 
operation and growth of their business.  Using this information to distinguish financially 
constrained from unconstrained firms, we hope to compensate for the paucity of firm-
level financial information. 
 Table 1 reports firm-level financing patterns averaged over all firms in each 
country.  In the WBES, enterprise managers were asked: “Please identify the share of 
your firm’s financing over the last year coming from each of the following sources.”  The 
sources are internal financial sources such as retained earnings or funds from family and 
friends and external financial sources such as equity, local commercial banks, foreign 
banks, supplier credit, leasing arrangements, development banks, and other government 
                                                                                                                                            
8 The survey covers 80 economies, but the sample is reduced because of missing firm-level or country 
information. 
9   To check the credibility of the financial data, we compare the largest WBES firms in each country with 
the Worldscope firms.  We find that on average Worldscope firms are six times larger than the largest firms 
in WBES, making comparisons difficult.  However, we do see that, if our sample of WBES firms in a 
country uses more bank debt to finance investment, the Worldscope firms in the same country also use 
more short-term and long-term debt relative to capital expenditures, and these correlations are significant at 
the 7% level. 
 9 
services or informal sources, such as moneylenders. 10  These proportions adds up to 
100%.11    
Insert Table 1 near here 
 We categorize the different sources of external financing into six groups. Bank 
Finance includes financing from local and foreign banks.  Equity Finance is financing 
through issue of stock (in the case of corporations) or from personal wealth (in the case of 
non incorporated firms).  Leasing Finance and Supplier Finance are funding through 
leasing arrangements and trade credit, respectively. Development Finance is funding 
from special development financing or other state services. Finally, finance from 
moneylenders and other traditional sources are classified as Informal Finance.12  
 We recognize that our financing pattern variables are different from those 
commonly used in the literature.  For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
focus on debt maturity and analyze long-term debt to total asset and long-term debt to 
total debt ratios. In our case, we do not have information on the amount of debt or total 
assets.  We know only the proportion of investment financed from a particular source 
over the last year, in which the denominator (unavailable) is the total amount of internal 
and external resources used for firm financing.  Firm financing refers to capital 
expenditures, working capital, and acquisitions. Unfortunately, the WBES data do not 
allow us to distinguish between financing of working capital versus investment.    
                                                
10 We recognize that whether funds from family and friends qualify as internal or external sources might be 
controversial. We also have the problem that funds from friends and family might be debt or equity. 
However, this category is limited, because no more than 1% or 2% of investment is financed using sources 
from friends and family. Furthermore, we are more interested in sources rather than security types in this 
study. 
11 We omit firms for which the proportions do not add up to one hundred. 
12 There is a remainder category, which amounts on average to 2% and on which we do not have detailed 
information.  
Deleted: )
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 As Fig. 1 and the first column of Table 1 show, in most countries including 
developed ones such as the US, UK and Germany, firms use internal resources to finance 
a significant portion of their investment.  Firms in several developing countries, such as 
Colombia, Malaysia, Poland, and others, use more external finance than firms in the US, 
where financial and legal development is one of the highest rated.  Not surprisingly, in 
some transitional countries with poorly developed institutions such as Armenia and 
Moldova, internal financing of investment can be as high as 90%.   However, at the other 
extreme, countries such as Italy and Trinidad and Tobago have internal financing at about 
30%. 
Insert Fig. 1 near here 
 Looking at different financing sources is informative because countries with 
similar overall external financing proportions can have very different financing patterns. 
For example, firms in Nicaragua and Chile appear to have similar financing patterns if 
one looks at only the external financing proportion.  However, Nicaraguan firms finance 
a large proportion of their investment using funds from development banks and supplier 
credit, whereas Chilean firms use much more bank finance.   More broadly, an inspection 
of the table indicates that in countries in which bank and equity financing is more limited, 
firms rely more on other forms of external finance. Table 1 also shows that the most 
common source of external finance is bank finance followed by supplier credit. 
3. Data and methodology  
 In our regression analysis, we relate firms’ financing patterns with other firm and 
country characteristics. In Table 2 we summarize relevant facts about the level of 
economic and financial development in the sample countries.  Detailed variable 
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definitions and sources are described in Appendix Table A2. Country-level variables are 
1995-1999 averages.  For each country, we present data on Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita, growth rate of GDP, and inflation.  In addition, we present private 
credit, an indicator of financial intermediary development commonly used in the 
literature: the ratio of credit issued to the private sector by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2000). Countries with 
higher levels of private credit have been shown to grow faster (Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza, 2000).   Stock market development is captured by Value Traded, which is given 
by value of shares traded divided by GDP and is a good indicator of stock market 
liquidity. Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck and Levine (2004) show a robust relation 
between stock market liquidity and GDP per capita growth.  Finally, we also present an 
indicator of property rights protection, Property Rights, which is an indicator compiled by 
the Heritage Foundation. Its values vary between one and five, with greater values 
indicating a greater level of protection of private property rights.  While not an indicator 
of financial development, Property Rights measures a key input into the efficient 
operation of financial contracts and thus financial development: the degree of protection 
of private property rights (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003: Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). 
Insert Table 2 near here 
 Inspection of Table 2 reveals a great deal of economic and financial variation 
across the sample countries.  Economic development ranges from Haiti, with an average 
GDP per capita of $369 to US and Germany, with per capita income of more than 
$30,000.    The countries also vary significantly in the rate of inflation, from a low of 0% 
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n the cases of Sweden and Argentina, up to 62% in the case of Bulgaria.  Both financial 
intermediary and stock market development, Private Credit and Value Traded, are higher 
in more developed countries although significant variation still exists at different levels of 
development.  Property rights protection also increases with GDP per capita in general, 
but there are many exceptions.  For example, China’s income per capita is higher than 
that of Pakistan’s, but property rights protection in Pakistan is rated highly at four, 
whereas China’s rating is one of the lowest at two. We expect firms in countries with 
higher levels of financial development to have better access to external finance. However, 
it is not clear if different sources of external finance are affected by financial 
development to the same extent or if firms of all sizes benefit equally.  
 Table 3 shows that the indicators of financial development are significantly 
correlated with external financing and different sources of finance.  Financial and 
institutional development, as measured by any of our three indicators, is positively 
correlated with the proportion of investment financed externally.  Private Credit is highly 
correlated with use of bank finance and stock market development: Value Traded is 
correlated with the use of equity.  Finally, better protection of property rights, Property 
Rights, is positively correlated with bank, equity, and leasing finance. However, we also 
note that many of the macroeconomic and financial indicators are correlated with each 
other.  
Insert Table 3 near here 
 Financing patterns also vary with firm characteristics, as can be seen in Table 3, 
which also reports the sample statistics of the firm-level variables we consider and their 
correlations. All of the firm-level variables are dummy variables, unless otherwise noted. 
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Small firms tend to rely on internal finance to a greater extent, with lower proportions of 
bank finance.  However, the correlations indicate that small firms also use less supplier 
credit and receive less credit from development banks, while relying more on informal 
finance.  Subsidized firms appear to receive some of these subsidies through bank loans 
and development financing.  Similarly, government-owned firms seem to rely more on 
development financing. Differences also are evident among industries.  Manufacturing 
firms are the greatest users of external finance, particularly bank finance. No significant 
differences seem to emerge in financing patterns between incorporated and non 
incorporated firms.  Because these firm characteristics are also correlated with size, it is 
important to control for them when investigating small firm financing patterns.   
 Papers in the literature also commonly include indicators of firms’ growth 
opportunities, such as firms’ market-to-book ratio of equity (see Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; and Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001).  Lacking such data 
we include firms’ sales growth rate over the last three years as an indicator of future 
growth opportunities.  Sales growth is positively and significantly correlated with 
external and equity finance. 
 Finally, capital structure studies cited above include indicators of firm 
profitability, such as return on assets, or dividend payments to total assets to capture 
financing constraints of firms.  Higher dividend payout ratios are taken as indicators of 
cash surplus relative to investment needs, making the firm less likely to finance 
externally.  While the proper interpretation of profitability ratios is much more 
controversial, again higher profits are negatively associated with external financing, 
potentially capturing lower levels of constraints.  Because we do not have data on 
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profitability, we use the survey responses to identify whether the firms are financially 
constrained or not.  Specifically, the WBES survey asked enterprise managers to rate the 
extent to which financing problems presented obstacles to the operation and growth of 
their business.  A rating of one denotes no obstacle; two, a minor obstacle; three, a 
moderate obstacle; and four, a major obstacle.  In the regressions this variable allows us 
to capture the extent to which a firm is financially constrained without relying on 
accounting data such as profits, dividends, and the like.13  The correlations in Table 3, 
Panel B suggest that firms reporting higher financing obstacles use less equity finance but 
substitute with external finance from other sources such as leasing, supplier, 
development, and informal sources. The correlations also indicate that small firms report 
facing higher financing obstacles.  We expect those firms reporting higher financing 
obstacles to have a greater need for external finance and thus use this variable as a proxy 
for cash constraints of firms.    
 However, the level of the constraint is also likely to be endogenous, because the 
firms become more and more constrained as they increase their external finance, making 
it difficult to identify causality.  We try to account for this effect both in our regressions 
and our interpretation by excluding the financing obstacle variable and running the 
regression across subsamples of firms with different reported financing constraints.  Also, 
                                                
13 Using survey data has problems because managers can blame financing obstacles for their own poor 
performance.  However, this likelihood must be balanced by the likelihood that accounting data used in 
cross-country research are also subject to distortion. Although the auditing process provides some control, 
the quality of these audits tend to vary systematically across countries and firm size (Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin, 2000).  While we cannot completely eliminate the possibility of bias due to unaudited self-reporting, 
we believe that it is unlikely to be a significant source of bias. First, Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and 
Schankerman  (2000) show that, in a subsample of 20 countries,  a close connection exists between 
responses and measurable outcomes.  They find no systematic bias in the survey responses.  Second, Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) show that survey responses are significantly correlated with 
actual outcomes after controlling for many factors and using instrumental variables to control for possible 
endogeneity. 
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the relation between financing constraints and patterns might vary across different firm 
size groups, which we explore through interaction terms.  
 The firm-level variables do not correspond one-to-one to more conventional firm-
level controls used by earlier papers.  For example, papers in the literature generally 
include descriptors of firms’ operating characteristics, or asset tangibility, such as net 
fixed assets to total assets and net sales to net fixed asset ratios as determinants of capital 
structure.  Firms that operate with greater fixed assets are shown to have greater 
borrowing capacity, whereas those firms with a higher sales-to-asset ratio are more likely 
to need more short term financing to support sales (see Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1999).  We do not have these variables available. Instead, we use indicators of firms’ 
industry and type of business to capture, at least partially, the differences in its operating 
characteristics. 
 Because Table 3 indicates a high degree of correlation between financing patterns 
and institutions, as well as other firm- and country-level variables, we use multivariate 
regression to clarify these relations. The dependent variables are the proportions of 
investment financed by external financing or through different sources of external 
finance.    
 As the observations are censored by zero and one hundred, we use Tobit 
regressions to estimate the financing patterns.  We use two different models to assess the 
relation between firm and country characteristics and firms’ financing patterns.  In all 
cases, the dependent variable is the proportion of investment financed by firm i in 
country k through external finance or different external financing sources, respectively.  
Specifically, first, we use a regression model with country-level fixed effects to assess the 
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relation between firms’ financing patterns and other firm characteristics.  Controlling for 
country fixed effects allows us to control not only for all kind of country-level factors but 
also for country-level biases in firms’ responses to both financing patterns and obstacles. 
Second, we replace the country-level fixed effects with our indicators of financial and 
institutional development, as well as other country factors associated with financing 
patterns. This allows us to directly relate firms’ financing patterns with countries’ 
financial and institutional development.14 In this specification, we relax the restriction 
that error terms across firms within a country are independent of each other to take into 
account possible unobserved country-level effects that might result in error correlations 
between firms in a given country; i.e., we allow for clustering on the country level. 
Finally, we return to the country-level fixed effects model to assess the differential 
impact of financial and institutional development on financing patterns of firms of 
different sizes.  
The coefficients in the Tobit regressions cannot be interpreted as marginal effects 
of the explanatory variable on the observed dependent variables.  Instead, they are the 
marginal effect of the underlying unobserved variables.  In the text, we therefore also 
discuss unconditional marginal effects of the observed dependent variable. These 
marginal effects take into account not only the change in financing for firms with 
                                                
14 While property rights protection is an exogenous variable, papers that study the relation between 
financial development and access to finance at the country level generally suffer from simultaneity issues in 
that it is not clear if it is the use of a particular type of financing (debt or equity) that leads to the 
development of debt or equity markets, or vice versa.  See, for example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and others.  However, because in this paper we analyze financing 
patterns of individual firms the causality is much more likely to go from country-level financial 
development to individual firm financing choices.  Further, none of our dependent variables  (proportion of 
external finance or the different sources) measures the actual quantity of financing as does Private Credit to 
GDP. 
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financing of a specific source between zero and one hundred but also changes in the 
probability that the financing proportion of a firm falls in this range (Maddala, 1986).    
 
4.  Results 
 The Table 4 results show that small firms use significantly less external finance 
than large firms. Here we run a baseline fixed effects regression; i.e., we include only 
firm-level explanatory variables and control for country fixed effects.  The lower use of 
external finance by small enterprises is explained by a lower use of bank finance. While 
medium-size enterprises do not use significantly less external finance than large firms, 
they use less bank finance. The relation between firm size and the use of bank finance is 
monotonic, increasing from small to medium and to large firms. Both small and medium-
size enterprises use significantly more informal financing sources than large firms.    The 
relation is also economically significant. The marginal effects suggest that small firms 
finance on average 12 percentage points less of investment with external finance than 
large firms, which compares with a mean External Finance of 41% and a standard 
deviation of 38%. The relative economic effect is even stronger for Bank Finance, in 
which the difference between small and large firms is 11 percentage points, compared 
with a mean Bank Finance of 19% and a standard deviation of 28%. We do not find any 
significant difference in the use of equity, trade, lease, or development finance across 
firms of different sizes.  Together, these results suggest that small firms cannot substitute 
other financing sources such as leasing, trade, or development finance for the lower 
access to bank finance.  The significantly higher use of informal finance compared with 
large firms is not sufficiently large to offset the lower use of bank finance.  
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Insert table 4 near here 
 The incorporation dummy is positive and significant in the external finance 
equation, but only at 10%.  The difference is again due to greater financing from banks, 
which is also significant at 10%.  Although corporations rely on equity financing to a 
greater extent, this effect is not significant.  This suggests that private equity plays as 
much a role in unincorporated firms as public equity plays in corporations. In unreported 
regressions, we also look at differences between incorporated and unincorporated firms in 
the use of equity finance but could not find any difference across size groups within the 
two subsamples.   
The results also indicate that firms reporting greater financing obstacles use more 
external finance.  This finding, however, is also consistent with the interpretation that, as 
firms use more external finance, they tend to face greater financing constraints.  Looking 
at different financing sources, we see that this relation holds for all sources except equity 
finance.  Splitting the sample into incorporated and unincorporated firms does not yield a 
significant coefficient on Financing Obstacle in the Equity Finance regression.15 This 
suggests a pecking order of financial sources, in which constrained firms are not able to 
issue equity to meet their financing needs.  
Table 4 also identifies several other firm characteristics associated with the use of 
different financing sources.  Not surprisingly, government-owned firms have easier 
access to resources from development institutions.  Foreign-owned firms finance a large 
share of investment with equity finance, but a lower share with lease and trade finance. 
Exporters use more external finance, especially bank, lease, and trade finance. Subsidized 
enterprises receive more external resources for investment, especially from development 
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institutions. No significant differences exist in financing patterns across firms in different 
sectors, and faster growing firms do not receive more external financing after accounting 
for other firm characteristics.  
In the remaining panels of Table 4, we explore the robustness of our findings to 
the potential endogeneity of the financing obstacle variable.  Panel B shows that our 
findings on the relation between firm patterns and other firm characteristics is confirmed 
when excluding the financing obstacle variable.  Specifically, the relation between firm 
size and the use of external and bank finance is confirmed.  Panels C and D show that our 
results are also confirmed when we split the sample according to the financing obstacle in 
firms that report financing as no or minor obstacle (Panel C) and firms that report 
financing as moderate or major obstacle (Panel D). However, these results also suggest 
that the relation between size and financing patterns is stronger for firms that are more 
financially constrained.   
Having established the importance of size for financing patterns, especially for the 
use of bank finance, we now assess the importance of financial and institutional 
development for financing patterns by replacing the fixed country effects with country-
level indicators of financial intermediary and stock market development as well as 
property right protection.  
Table 5 shows the importance of financial and institutional development for 
firms’ use of different financing sources. Table 5, Panel A shows that firms in countries 
with higher levels of financial intermediary development, as measured by Private Credit, 
use more external finance and, specifically, use more lease and development finance. 
Firms in countries with higher levels of stock market development, as measured by Value 
                                                                                                                                            
15 Results available on request. 
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Traded, use more equity and lease finance, although overall stock market development is 
not significantly associated with more extensive use of external financing sources (Table 
5, Panel B). Firms in countries with better property right protection use more external 
finance, especially bank and equity finance (Table 5, Panel C).  These results are 
confirmed when we include all three measures of financial and institutional development 
together (Table 5, Panel D). Further, we find a significant effect of Private Credit, Value 
Traded and Property Rights on equity finance only for incorporated, but not for 
unincorporated enterprises.16 Even controlling for the level of institutional and financial 
development, however, we still find the same significant association of firm size with 
financing patterns as in Table 4. 
Insert Table 5 near here 
The effect of Private Credit and Property Rights on External Finance varies 
between these two indicators. The average firm in Chile (75th percentile of Private 
Credit) uses 2 percentage points more external finance than the average firm in Costa 
Rica (25th percentile of Private Credit).  The average firm in Uruguay (75th percentile of 
Property Rights) uses 6 percentage points more external finance than the average firm in 
Venezuela (25th percentile of Property Rights).17 
Turning to the country-level control variables, we do not find a robust association 
of the level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita, with financing 
patterns. Similarly, firms in faster growing economies do not experience different 
financing patterns from firms in countries that grow more slowly. Higher levels of 
                                                
16 Results available on request. 
17 Note that Private Credit variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the private credit to GDP.  
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inflation have a negative effect on the overall reliance on external finance and are 
associated with lesser use of bank and supplier finance.      
Together, these results suggest a strong impact of financial and institutional 
development, especially of property rights protection on the use of external finance by 
firms.  But does this effect vary across different firm size groups?  
Table 6 explores the variation of the relation between financial and institutional 
development with financing patterns across different size group of firms.  Specifically, 
we return to the fixed effects specification of Table 4 and introduce interaction terms of 
Private Credit, Value Traded, and Property Rights with dummies for large, medium-size 
and small firms.  Similarly, we explore whether the significant relation between financing 
obstacles and financing patterns varies across firms of different sizes.  
Insert Table 6 near here 
We find evidence that private credit increases the use of external financing 
sources by large firms, especially bank and development finance. Small firms seem to 
benefit somewhat from financial intermediary development by a larger use of lease and 
development finance and lower use of informal finance. No differential effect exists of 
financial intermediary development on medium-size firms. Small and large firms in 
countries with higher levels of stock market development use more lease finance, perhaps 
because leasing firms have fewer problems funding their loans. Finally, better property 
right protection is conducive to higher use of external, especially bank finance.  The 
positive effect of Property Rights on Bank Finance decreases in firm size: Small firms 
benefit relatively more from better property right protection than medium-size firms that 
in turn benefit more than large firms.  
Formatted: Indent: First line:  0.5"
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 The effect of property rights protection on closing the external financing gap 
between small and large firms is relatively large. Small firms in Uruguay (75th percentile 
of Property Rights) finance 9 percentage points more investment with external finance 
than small firms in Venezuela (25th  percentile of Property Rights), while the difference 
is only 5 percentage points for large firms.   
Table 6 also indicates that for large firms higher financing constraints are 
associated with greater levels of external finance than medium-size enterprises.  And 
similarly for medium-size enterprises, higher constraints are associated with greater 
levels of external finance than small enterprises.  Given the endogenous nature of this 
variable, it is difficult to assess causality, but these results are consistent with larger firms 
more easily being able to meet their financing needs and being constrained at higher 
levels of external finance.  When we look at financing sources, we see that this finding is 
mostly due to a monotonic increase in the relation between financing obstacles and bank 
finance.  Constrained large firms also use more lease, supplier, and, surprisingly, 
informal finance.  
The Table 6 results thus show that better property right protection can level the 
playing field between small and large firms in terms of the use of external and especially 
bank finance. However, financially constrained firms still have an easier time expanding 
their use of external finance if they are large instead of small.   
The estimates so far can be interpreted to show that firms with greater financing 
needs are more likely to rely on different sources of external finance.  However, thus far, 
we have not imposed any a priori ordering of sources of external financing. The pecking 
order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) posits that adverse selection in the market for 
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external finance makes it efficient for the firm to access equity last after all other sources 
of external finance are exhausted.18   
Traditional pecking order theory does not consider the incentives of investors to 
acquire costly proprietary information about the issues. Fughlieri and Lukin (2001) 
predict that, when the cost of acquiring proprietary information is not too high, a reverse 
pecking order could occur. In this reverse pecking order, firms are more likely to issue 
equity securities before incurring additional debt because equity provides more incentives 
for information gathering by private investors. Consistent with this prediction, Gomes 
and Phillips (2006) find that a reverse pecking order for private placements coexists with 
a traditional pecking order for public issues.  
While our data do not allow us a sophisticated test of the pecking order, we can 
assess the relation between financing constraints and the use of equity finance.  The 
simple correlation coefficient from Table 3 suggests a negative relation.  However, this 
refers to the proportion of investment financed with equity, while the pecking order 
theory predicts that firms do not use any equity before they exhaust their capacity to 
finance investment with other external financing sources. If the traditional pecking order 
is correct, we would expect to see a low proportion of firms financing investment with 
equity finance in countries in which a large proportion of firms report that they are 
financially constrained.   We therefore consider the empirical relation between the share 
of firms that report to be financially constrained in a country and the share that uses 
equity finance for investment. Fig. 2 shows a negative relation between the proportion of 
firms in a country that report financing to be a major constraint and the proportion of 
                                                
18 The empirical tests of pecking order theories in the United States have not produced unanimity. Thus, for 
example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find support for the traditional pecking order, whereas studies 
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firms that use any equity finance for investment.  This relation is robust to the exclusion 
of outliers and holds both for incorporated and unincorporated enterprises.  
Insert Fig 2 near here 
Fig. 2 suggests that the traditional pecking order theory indeed holds: The more 
firms in a country are financially constrained, the less likely is an extensive use of equity 
as a source of investment finance, be it through issue of shares or private equity.  This 
last result is of interest given the Fughlieri and Lukin (2001) theoretical prediction that, 
when costs of private information gathering are relatively low, firms that issue securities 
through private placements adopt a reverse pecking order. We find no evidence of such a 
reversal of the pecking order. This finding suggests that the costs of private information 
acquisition are high or that the rights of minority equityholders are insufficiently strong 
to provide adequate incentives to overcome the adverse selection effects in the market for 
equity. 
   
5. Conclusions 
 We investigate how firm financing patterns differ around the world for large 
versus small firms. Using a unique firm-level survey database in 48 countries, we find 
that firm size, financial development, and property rights protection are important factors 
in explaining the observed variation in financing patterns.  In contrast to earlier literature, 
80% of our sample is composed of small and medium size firms. We examine a broader 
spectrum of external financing sources, which includes not only debt and equity finance, 
but also leasing and supplier finance, development bank, and informal finance.  
                                                                                                                                            
by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2005) do not. 
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Our results indicate that firm size plays an important role in understanding 
financing patterns. Small firms use less external finance, especially bank finance.  But 
small firms also benefit the most from better protection of property rights in terms of 
accessing formal sources of external finance, particularly bank finance.  Finance from 
development banks and other government sources are used to a greater extent by larger 
firms.  Similarly, leasing and supplier finance does not fill in the financing gap of small 
firms.  Thus, the most effective way of improving small firms’ access to external finance 
appears to be through institutional reforms addressing the weaknesses in legal and 
financial systems.   
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                 Figure 1. Financing Patterns Around the World.  Internal finance is the proportion of investment financed 
                 by retained earnings and from family and friends.  All other financing are considered external.  Values reported 
                 are firm averages by country.  Countries are ranked in descending order according to internal financing. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the share of financially constrained firms and share 
of firms using equity finance 
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Table 1 
 
Financing patterns around the world. Figures given are firm averages for each country, and they are the proportion of 
investment financed by each source. External finance is the sum of bank, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development 
bank and informal finance. Bank finance includes financing from domestic as well as foreign banks.  Development 
bank includes funding from both development and public sector banks.  Informal includes funding from money lenders 
and traditional or informal sources. 
Country 
External 
Finance Bank Equity Leasing 
Supplier 
Credit 
Development 
Bank Informal 
Argentina 43.45 29.99 2.81 0.75 7.48 1.60 0.82 
Armenia 11.42 4.53 0.00 1.08 0.88 3.58 0.68 
Belarus 20.36 5.73 1.09 0.90 3.13 9.40 0.12 
Belize 38.93 20.36 13.57 0.00 3.21 1.79 0.00 
Bolivia 38.97 27.02 0.00 0.00 8.26 0.29 0.74 
Brazil 51.80 23.06 6.88 4.65 11.37 4.20 0.40 
Bulgaria 26.78 6.03 1.38 3.45 6.47 3.82 2.87 
Canada 48.55 23.45 8.39 2.39 3.39 5.93 5.00 
Chile 57.34 41.34 0.26 2.57 7.71 0.48 1.00 
China 29.93 10.17 2.41 1.63 2.41 4.63 5.93 
Colombia 55.22 29.18 0.37 1.97 12.45 4.78 0.00 
Costa Rica 37.92 21.13 0.19 0.15 7.54 2.08 1.35 
Croatia 41.31 19.79 3.02 0.31 8.19 6.23 2.47 
Czech Republic 32.50 13.90 0.66 3.90 3.75 6.84 3.46 
Dominican Republic 42.58 25.32 0.56 0.08 10.40 0.95 1.77 
El Salvador 55.00 32.03 4.59 0.54 9.19 3.92 0.14 
Estonia 60.14 20.81 14.71 9.46 6.96 3.07 3.35 
France 30.91 6.76 5.76 4.30 7.36 1.42 1.67 
Germany 54.29 16.84 23.13 0.74 0.94 8.52 4.13 
Guatemala 57.34 28.38 1.09 2.78 18.72 2.63 0.63 
Haiti 24.17 10.83 0.24 0.24 2.38 10.24 0.24 
Honduras 44.33 29.17 1.00 0.00 9.00 2.67 2.50 
Hungary 35.86 13.99 6.96 2.41 5.06 6.05 1.39 
Indonesia 21.83 17.17 0.00 1.67 0.67 1.67 0.00 
Italy 77.71 49.67 6.88 1.67 5.83 1.17 4.17 
Lithuania 39.60 12.42 11.74 4.08 5.24 1.32 4.79 
Malaysia 40.62 13.81 4.76 3.48 13.81 4.05 0.71 
Mexico 34.33 6.83 7.00 0.33 11.17 5.33 3.50 
Moldova 20.07 10.11 0.49 2.01 4.40 2.22 0.83 
Nicaragua 56.70 19.32 1.36 0.91 15.23 7.61 3.18 
Pakistan 43.13 29.96 5.63 1.50 2.92 1.04 2.08 
Panama 64.02 47.15 2.07 1.22 5.00 1.17 0.24 
Peru 35.53 20.90 0.50 0.50 9.08 1.68 0.88 
Philippines 36.55 17.49 1.96 1.41 10.84 4.49 0.36 
Poland 58.60 15.44 27.58 4.50 4.60 4.33 1.72 
Romania 25.91 11.53 3.01 2.44 4.09 2.67 2.16 
Singapore 45.17 28.06 7.67 1.16 6.14 0.58 0.00 
Slovak Republic 30.84 9.26 1.17 10.23 4.00 3.45 2.60 
Slovenia 38.55 16.99 3.51 2.88 8.27 4.61 1.04 
Spain 39.78 23.00 0.67 8.04 4.22 2.62 1.22 
Sweden 43.42 19.70 8.33 1.22 6.16 3.43 1.12 
Trinidad and Tobago 71.35 40.00 12.73 0.85 15.18 1.85 0.00 
Turkey 43.98 20.41 9.68 4.85 1.42 6.21 1.17 
Ukraine 25.80 7.21 2.53 1.01 7.84 4.45 2.71 
United Kingdom 36.12 13.14 11.56 2.91 7.47 0.58 0.47 
United States 47.12 21.47 3.24 6.09 6.62 6.76 2.94 
Uruguay 54.04 39.79 1.38 0.74 8.30 2.77 0.00 
Venezuela 28.73 14.80 3.05 0.50 5.88 1.75 0.25 
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Table 2 
 
Economic, financial and institutional indicators. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is real GDP per capita in US dollars. Inflation is the 
log difference of the Consumer Price Index. Growth is the growth rate of GDP in US dollars. Private credit is financial sector credit to private 
sector divided by GDP.  Value Traded is the value of shares traded to GDP.  Property Rights is rating from one to five of the degree to which 
property rights are protected in a nation.  All country variables are 1995-1999 averages.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in 
the Appendix.  
 
Country GDP/capita Inflation Growth Private Credit Value Traded Property  Rights 
Argentina 8000.15 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.04 4.00 
Armenia 844.11 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.00 3.00 
Bulgaria 1414.61 0.62 -0.02 0.14 0.00 3.00 
Belarus 2234.91 0.54 0.07 0.06 0.00 3.00 
Belize 2737.70 0.01 0.00 0.43 0.00 4.00 
Bolivia 938.55 0.06 0.01 0.51 0.00 3.00 
Brazil 4491.67 0.07 0.00 0.32 0.17 3.00 
Canada 20548.97 0.01 0.02 0.83 0.49 5.00 
Chile 5002.70 0.05 0.03 0.68 0.11 5.00 
China 676.76 0.02 0.07 0.85 0.27 2.00 
Colombia 2381.19 0.15 -0.01 0.36 0.02 3.00 
Costa Rica 3692.47 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.00 3.00 
Czech Republic 5158.04 0.07 0.00 0.58 0.11 4.00 
Germany 30794.03 0.01 0.01 1.06 0.43 5.00 
Dominican Republic 1712.31 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.00 2.00 
Spain 15858.03 0.02 0.03 0.79 0.66 4.00 
Estonia 3663.49 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.12 4.00 
France 27719.92 0.01 0.02 0.84 0.28 4.00 
United Kingdom 20186.56 0.03 0.02 1.16 0.73 5.00 
Guatemala 1503.25 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.00 3.00 
Honduras 707.52 0.15 0.00 0.26 0.03 3.00 
Croatia 3845.27 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Haiti 368.73 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Hungary 4705.65 0.14 0.04 0.22 0.02 4.00 
Indonesia 1045.04 0.18 -0.02 0.52 0.13 3.00 
Italy 19645.96 0.02 0.01 0.57 0.19 4.00 
Lithuania 1907.93 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.01 3.00 
Moldova 667.74 0.16 -0.03 0.06 0.06 3.00 
Mexico 3394.75 0.18 0.04 0.22 0.12 3.00 
Malaysia 4536.23 0.03 0.01 1.30 1.14 4.00 
Nicaragua 434.69 0.10 0.03 0.31 0.00 2.00 
Pakistan 505.59 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.13 4.00 
Panama 3123.95 0.01 0.02 0.78 0.00 3.00 
Peru 2334.94 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.06 3.00 
Philippines 1125.81 0.07 0.01 0.50 0.23 4.00 
Poland 3216.04 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.04 4.00 
Romania 1372.02 0.42 -0.02 0.09 0.01 2.00 
Singapore 24948.09 0.01 0.02 1.11 0.61 5.00 
El Salvador 1705.79 0.04 0.01 0.36 0.00 3.00 
Slovakia 3805.41 0.07 0.04 0.30 0.08 3.00 
Slovenia 10232.73 0.08 0.04 0.26 0.02 3.00 
Sweden 28258.28 0.00 0.02 0.82 0.66 4.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4526.28 0.04 0.04 0.40 0.02 5.00 
Turkey 2993.89 0.46 0.01 0.16 0.28 4.00 
Ukraine 866.52 0.23 -0.03 0.02 0.00 3.00 
Uruguay 6113.60 0.14 0.02 0.27 0.00 4.00 
United States 29250.32 0.02 0.03 1.84 1.12 5.00 
Venezuela 3482.51 0.34 -0.02 0.10 0.02 3.00 
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Table 3 
 
Summary statistics and correlations. N refers to firm level observations for 48 countries.  Bank finance, Equity, Leasing, Supplier 
credit, Development bank, and Informal are financing proportions that stand for the proportion of investment financed externally, by 
bank debt, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development, and public sector banks and money lenders, respectively.  Firm size-small 
takes the value one if the firm is a small firm and zero otherwise.  Firm size–medium takes the value one if the firm is a medium firm 
and zero otherwise. Manufacturing takes the value one for firms in manufacturing and zero otherwise.  Similarly, Services takes the 
value one for firms in the services sector and zero otherwise.  Firm growth is given by percent change in sales.  Government and 
Foreign are dummy variables that take the value one if the firm has government or foreign ownership and zero if not.  Exporter is a 
dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.  Subsidized is also a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives 
subsidies from the national or local authorities. Corporation is a dummy that indicates whether a firm is incorporated.  GDP/ capita is 
real Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in US dollars.  Inflation is the log difference of the Consumer Price Index.  Growth is 
the growth rate of GDP in US dollars.  Financing Obstacle is an index that measures how problematic financing is to the operation and 
growth of a business.  Private Credit is the financial sector credit to the private sector divided by GDP.  Value Traded is the value of 
shares traded to GDP.  Property Rights is a rating from one to five of the degree to which property rights are protected in a nation.  All 
country variables are 1995-1999 averages. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the Appendix.  * indicates a 
significance level of 5%. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
      
Variable N Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
   
Minimum Maximum 
External Finance 2,754 40.59 37.97 0.00 100.00 
Bank Finance 2,754 19.41 28.30 0.00 100.00 
Equity Finance 2,754 5.68 17.40 0.00 100.00 
Leasing 2,754 2.55 10.06 0.00 100.00 
Supplier Credit 2,754 6.72 15.86 0.00 100.00 
Development Bank 2,754 2.95 11.94 0.00 100.00 
Informal 2,754 1.76 8.89 0.00 100.00 
Firm Size - small 2,754 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Firm Size - medium 2,754 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Manufacturing 2,754 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Services 2,754 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Firm Growth 2,754 0.14 0.56 -1.00 8.00 
Subsidized 2,754 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Government 2,754 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Foreign 2,754 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Exporter 2,754 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Financing Obstacle 2,734 2.80 1.13 1.00 4.00 
Corporation 2,754 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
GDP/capita 48 6,052 7,906 369 30,794 
Inflation 48 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.62 
Growth 48 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.07 
Private Credit 48 0.37 0.35 0.00 1.84 
Value Traded 48 0.15 0.24 0.00 1.14 
Property Rights 48 3.43 0.90 1.00 5.00 
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Panel B. Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables 
Variable 
External 
Finance 
Bank 
Finance 
Equity 
Finance 
Leasing Supplier 
Credit 
Development 
Bank 
Informal Firm size-small Firm size- 
medium 
Manufacturing Services Firm 
Growth 
External Finance 1            
Bank Finance 0.6282* 1           
Equity Finance 0.3517* -0.0902* 1          
Leasing 0.2158* -0.0471* -0.0083 1         
Supplier Credit 0.3727* -0.0145 -0.0432* -0.0013 1        
Development Bank 0.2255* -0.0809* -0.0238 -0.0042 -0.0185 1       
Informal 0.1591* -0.0792* -0.0107 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0114 1      
Firm size-small -0.1846* -0.2160* 0.0163 0.0098 -0.0393* -0.0616* 0.0539* 1     
Firm size-medium 0.0807* 0.0681* 0.0058 0.0118 0.0498* 0.0505* -0.0055 -0.6900* 1    
Manufacturing 0.0649* 0.1261* -0.0589* -0.0332 0.0228 0.0201 -0.0172 -0.2242* 0.1094* 1   
Services -0.0441* -0.0901* 0.0265 0.0429* -0.0037 -0.0377* 0.0127 0.2055* -0.1201* -0.7700* 1  
Firm Growth 0.0572* 0.0049 0.0754* 0.0306 -0.0047 0.0306 -0.0267 -0.0223 0.0249 -0.0211 0.0199 1 
Subsidized 0.0868* 0.0581* -0.0059 0.0301 -0.0267 0.1207* -0.0211 -0.1347* 0.0479* 0.0374* -0.0742* 0.0171 
Government 0.0566* 0.0313 0.0148 -0.0115 -0.016 0.0649* 0.0034 -0.1563* 0.0755* 0.1145* -0.0786* -0.0293 
Foreign 0.0736* 0.0813* 0.0284 -0.0497* -0.0136 0.0192 -0.0301 -0.2342* 0.0238 0.1194* -0.0426* 0.0398* 
Exporter 0.1440* 0.1523* 0.03 0.0471* 0.0228 0.0124 -0.0194 -0.2489* 0.0899* 0.3683* -0.2960* 0.0911* 
GDP/capita 0.0814* 0.0572* 0.0815* 0.0195 -0.0247 0.0171 0.0048 -0.0487* 0.0427* -0.0772* 0.0658* 0.0614* 
Inflation -0.1574* -0.1558* -0.0422* 0.0062 -0.0645* 0.0335 0.0022 0.1028* -0.0266 0.0456* -0.1142* -0.0430* 
Growth 0.1107* 0.0414* 0.1395* 0.0518* -0.0173 0.0153 0.0205 -0.0054 0.0214 -0.0073 0.0246 0.1330* 
Financing Obstacle 0.0237 -0.0034 -0.0422* 0.0408* 0.0359 0.0373 0.0675* 0.0832* 0.0186 0.0524* -0.1144* -0.0967* 
Private Credit 0.0955* 0.1008* 0.0002 0.0207 0.0057 0.0167 0.0005 -0.0493* -0.0161 -0.0263 0.0576* 0.0121 
Value Traded 0.0441* 0.0157 0.0487* 0.0584* -0.0161 0.0246 0.0044 -0.0108 0.0217 -0.0627* 0.0525* 0.0217 
Property Rights 0.1683* 0.1243* 0.1722* 0.0593* -0.0006 -0.0113 -0.0179 -0.0062 0.0371 -0.1034* 0.0708* 0.0848* 
Corporation 0.0154 0.0299 0.0071 0.02 0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0171 -0.1397* 0.1114* 0.0361 -0.0389* 0.028 
             
 
Subsidized Government Foreign Exporter GDP/capita Inflation Growth Financing 
Obstacle 
Private 
Credit 
Value Traded Property 
Rights 
Corporation 
Subsidized 1            
Government 0.1186* 1           
Foreign 0.0441* 0.0706* 1          
Exporter 0.1111* 0.1187* 0.2186* 1         
GDP/capita 0.1011* -0.0093 0.0958* 0.0934* 1        
Inflation -0.0407* 0.0327 -0.1004* -0.0831* -0.3787* 1       
Growth 0.0385* 0.0793* 0.0224 0.1352* 0.1297* -0.3494* 1      
Financing Obstacle -0.0275 0.0208 -0.1423* -0.0327 -0.2306* 0.1642* -0.1258* 1     
Private Credit 0.0904* -0.0485* 0.1239* 0.0566* 0.7408* -0.4703* 0.1242* -0.1940* 1    
Value Traded 0.0887* -0.0550* 0.0637* 0.0445* 0.7559* -0.2920* 0.0840* -0.1812* 0.8437* 1   
Property Rights 0.0717* -0.0850* 0.0455* 0.0847* 0.5850* -0.2624* 0.1444* -0.2024* 0.5343* 0.5358* 1  
Corporation 0.0171 0.0981* 0.1065* 0.1044* 0.2302* -0.1193* 0.0263 -0.0749* 0.1172* 0.1988* 0.1639* 1 
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Determinants of financing patterns; the role of firm size. The estimated fixed effects interval regression model is FINANCING SOURCE = 
α0 + α1 GOVERNMENT + α2 FOREIGN + α3 EXPORTER + α4 SUBSIDIZED + α5 MANUFACTURING + α6 SERVICES + α7 FIRM 
GROWTH + α8 SMALL + α9 MEDIUM + α10 CORPORATION + α11 FINANCING OBSTACLE + α12 COUNTRY DUMMIES + ε.  
FINANCING SOURCE is the proportion of investment financed by external sources, bank debt, equity, leasing, supplier credit,  
development banks, or informal sources. External finance is the sum of bank, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development bank and 
informal finance. Bank finance includes financing from domestic as well as foreign banks.  Development bank includes funding from both 
development and public sector banks.  Informal includes funding from money lenders and traditional or informal sources. GOVERNMENT 
and FOREIGN are dummy variables indicating whether a firm has government or foreign ownership, respectively; EXPORTER is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is an exporting firm; SUBSIDIZED is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives 
subsidies from the national or local authorities; MANUFACTURING is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is in the 
manufacturing sector; SERVICES is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is in the services sector; FIRM GROWTH is firm sales 
growth; SMALL is a dummy variable that indicates whether firm size is small; MEDIUM is a dummy variable that indicates whether firm 
size is medium; CORPORATION is  a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is incorporated; and FINANCING OBSTACLE is an 
index that measures how problematic financing is to the operation and growth of a business, and ranges from no obstacle (1), to minor 
obstacle (2), to moderate obstacle (3), to major obstacle (4). Variable definitions and sources are detailed in the Appendix.  All regressions 
are run as tobit regressions and include country fixed effects.  Panel A uses the full sample and estimates the full model, Panel B uses the 
full sample but omits the financing obstacle variable, Panel C restricts the sample to firms that report no or minor financing obstacles, and 
Panel D restricts the sample to firms with moderate or major financing obstacles. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *= significant at 
5%; **= significant at 1%. 
 
Variable External 
Finance 
Bank Equity Lease Supplier Credit Development 
Bank 
Informal 
Panel A. Full Sample 
 
     
GOVERNMENT 5.539 -1.375 9.997 -6.198 0.918 18.157 1.211 
 [5.373] [4.863] [6.669] [5.489] [4.646] [7.868]* [8.626] 
FOREIGN -0.902 -3.28 18.077 -9.882 -6.056 6.41 -5.267 
 [3.261] [2.921] [4.886]** [3.614]** [2.975]* [5.091] [5.671] 
EXPORTER 7.073 6.677 -0.51 6.707 5.956 -3.336 -2.091 
 [2.795]* [2.549]** [4.278] [2.778]* [2.582]* [4.668] [4.769] 
SUBSIDIZED 9.239 2.45 1.865 8.481 -0.994 33.122 -2.174 
 [3.983]* [3.784] [5.770] [4.073]* [3.414] [5.002]** [6.752] 
MANUFACTURING 0.938 6.888 -10.994 -0.81 6.214 -3.085 -5.952 
 [3.856] [3.673] [6.191] [3.942] [3.857] [5.941] [6.718] 
SERVICES -0.771 -0.379 -3.833 8.017 5.479 -8.376 -1.605 
 [3.730] [3.624] [5.858] [3.764]* [3.857] [5.724] [6.391] 
FIRM GROWTH 1.062 0.085 0.973 -0.024 -0.382 5.871 -3.001 
 [2.384] [2.109] [2.925] [1.987] [2.134] [3.723] [3.471] 
SMALL -20.757 -24.476 -8.156 -6.235 -1.024 -10.708 17.24 
 [3.873]*
* 
[3.433]** [5.930] [4.378] [3.577] [6.436] [7.702]* 
MEDIUM -6.599 -9.221 -8.5 -0.308 5.976 2.081 16.857 
 [3.455] [3.061]** [5.205] [3.895] [3.101] [5.197] [7.221]* 
CORPORATION 7.062 7.262 8.818 3.808 -1.319 -0.484 -2.621 
 [3.105]* [2.864]* [4.746] [2.876] [2.785] [4.969] [4.808] 
FINANCING 
OBSTACLE 
6.363 4.762 3.241 2.471 2.333 3.776 7.982 
 [1.211]*
* 
[1.113]** [1.819] [1.214]* [1.088]* [1.911]* [2.134]** 
Constant 19.765 9.444 -97.79 -74.248 -35.418 -92.108 -128.708 
 [8.830]* [7.992] [16.138]** [12.312]** [8.005]** [15.676]** [20.483]** 
        
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2734 
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Panel B. FINANCING OBSTACLE omitted 
 
    
GOVERNMENT 6.643 -0.584 11.067 -6.284 0.911 19.402 2.219 
 [5.464] [4.830] [6.665] [5.534] [4.644] [7.780]* [8.595] 
FOREIGN -3.049 -4.682 16.551 -10.548 -6.755 5.018 -7.633 
 [3.274] [2.900] [4.854]** [3.585]** [2.977]* [5.055] [5.696] 
EXPORTER 8.054 7.392 0.643 6.853 6.231 -3.043 -1.423 
 [2.819]** [2.560]** [4.253] [2.785]* [2.587]* [4.650] [4.769] 
SUBSIDIZED 9.589 2.622 1.554 8.522 -0.747 33.294 -1.686 
 [4.012]* [3.766] [5.748] [4.076]* [3.423] [4.983]** [6.792] 
MANUFACTURING -0.39 6.102 -11.118 -0.835 5.795 -4.925 -6.061 
 [3.883] [3.674] [6.149] [3.938] [3.862] [5.861] [6.777] 
SERVICES -3.42 -1.999 -4.558 7.202 4.711 -11.097 -3.148 
 [3.741] [3.608] [5.794] [3.738] [3.842] [5.614]* [6.375] 
FIRM GROWTH 0.822 -0.373 1.643 -0.078 -0.71 5.034 -3.847 
 [2.408] [2.105] [2.979] [1.968] [2.128] [3.741] [3.554] 
SMALL -18.456 -22.821 -6.689 -5.769 -0.28 -8.935 18.933 
 [3.893]** [3.430]** [5.876] [4.343] [3.547] [6.345] [7.770]* 
MEDIUM -4.598 -7.819 -7.395 0.485 6.564 3.558 18.574 
 [3.479] [3.058]* [5.168] [3.863] [3.073]* [5.177] [7.284]* 
CORPORATION 6.477 6.826 8.378 3.744 -1.426 -1.155 -3.519 
 [3.124]* [2.870]* [4.739] [2.863] [2.784] [5.001] [4.822] 
Constant 40.917 25.058 -87.348 -66.552 -27.735 -77.89 -101.715 
 [7.839]** [6.945]** [15.274]** [11.249]** [7.422]** [14.647]** [19.177]** 
        
Number of  
observations 2,754 2,754 2,754 2,754 2,754 2754 2,754 
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Panel C. FINANCING OBSTACLE = 1 or 2     
GOVERNMENT -6.676 1.653 0.66 -9.451 5.439 8.786 23.932 
 [9.488] [8.016] [10.183] [7.383] [6.897] [11.906] [16.096] 
FOREIGN -4.785 -2.351 16.685 -14.386 -4.026 9.175 -5.806 
 [5.469] [4.591] [7.100]* [4.778]** [4.236] [8.136] [10.682] 
EXPORTER 11.975 7.531 3.481 8.116 7.831 6.186 -8.516 
 [4.998]* [4.347] [6.568] [3.901]* [4.135] [0.000] [8.654] 
SUBSIDIZED 0.837 4.446 0.895 2.534 -1.588 24.68 -0.094 
 [7.489] [6.352] [8.960] [5.971] [5.551] [8.726]** [14.502] 
MANUFACTURING -0.978 13.653 -20.117 -3.327 -1.487 6.804 7.248 
 [8.141] [7.448] [10.623] [5.863] [6.828] [12.374] [15.336] 
SERVICES 3.693 3.123 -3.108 5.628 2.266 7.659 8.493 
 [7.742] [7.149] [9.794] [5.484] [6.682] [12.384] [13.738] 
FIRM GROWTH -1.718 -3.218 0.191 -3.989 1.066 5.82 -0.076 
 [4.528] [3.711] [4.751] [2.840] [3.219] [6.074] [4.153] 
SMALL -13.77 -15.142 -6.815 5.232 6.532 -0.844 28.48 
 [6.660]* [5.711]** [9.450] [6.114] [5.535] [10.693] [14.370]* 
MEDIUM -5.1 -5.276 -11.03 2.831 13.54 -4.807 19.953 
 [5.834] [4.939] [7.744] [5.114] [4.698]** [8.684] [14.069] 
CORPORATION 18.966 10.385 23.69 1.143 -5.094 -1.618 4.633 
 [5.794]** [5.051]* [8.053]** [4.014] [4.655] [8.119] [10.089] 
Constant 15.417 8.29 -108.915 -40.056 -40.419 -348.125 -324.199 
 [19.507] [16.663] [35.435]** [16.563]* [14.524]** [46.299]** [0.000] 
        
Number of observations 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 
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Panel D. FINANCING OBSTACLE = 3 or 4      
GOVERNMENT 9.246 -4.295 19.954 -5.511 -4.985 21.341 -3.793 
 [6.409] [6.236] [8.713]* [7.730] [6.081] [9.542]* [9.857] 
FOREIGN 0.227 -4.316 13.851 -3.695 -7.263 2.847 -6.374 
 [4.035] [3.837] [6.447]* [5.168] [4.118] [6.342] [6.535] 
EXPORTER 4.701 6.199 -2.262 6.377 5.234 -4.888 0.383 
 [3.376] [3.126]* [5.561] [3.826] [3.261] [5.665] [5.509] 
SUBSIDIZED 13.204 1.128 0.7 12.196 -1.781 36.441 -3.476 
 [4.627]** [4.696] [7.739] [5.497]* [4.382] [5.971]** [7.875] 
MANUFACTURING 3.06 4.341 -1.872 0.732 10.322 -3.54 -5.026 
 [4.298] [4.137] [7.342] [5.145] [4.598]* [6.516] [7.338] 
SERVICES -2.273 -0.021 -3.53 9.778 6.903 -13.817 -1.56 
 [4.197] [4.121] [7.076] [4.957]* [4.641] [6.444]* [7.242] 
FIRM GROWTH 3.092 2.081 2.244 3.148 -0.802 5.023 -4.219 
 [2.780] [2.541] [3.571] [2.835] [2.838] [4.431] [4.628] 
SMALL -25.63 -30.877 -9.733 -13.191 -4.925 -11.934 9.876 
 [4.811]** [4.467]** [7.642] [6.119]* [4.663] [7.564] [8.698] 
MEDIUM -9.798 -13.225 -7.811 -3.245 1.639 6.099 13.099 
 [4.285]* [3.971]** [6.834] [5.566] [4.130] [6.457] [8.253] 
CORPORATION 0.764 4.923 1.507 3.966 0.721 1.276 -3.911 
 [3.671] [3.515] [5.966] [3.833] [3.463] [5.893] [5.381] 
Constant 50.804 33.065 -78.238 -77.615 -23.263 -64.692 -89.685 
 [8.387]** [7.589]** [16.525]** [14.438]** [8.488]** [14.710]** [19.621]** 
        
Number of 
observations 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,729 1,729 
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Table 5 
 
Determinants of financing patterns; the role of institutions. The estimated interval regression model is FINANCING SOURCE = α0 + α1 
GOVERNMENT + α2 FOREIGN + α3 EXPORTER + α4 SUBSIDIZED + α5 MANUFACTURING + α6 SERVICES + α7 FIRM GROWTH + 
α8 SMALL + α9 MEDIUM + α10 CORPORATION + α11 FINANCING OBSTACLE + α12 INFLATION + α13 GROWTH + α14 GDP PER 
CAPITA + α15 PRIVATE CREDIT / VALUE TRADED / PROPERTY RIGHTS + ε (clustered by country). FINANCING SOURCE is the 
proportion of investment financed by external sources, bank debt, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development banks, or informal sources. 
External finance is the sum of bank, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development bank, and informal finance. Bank finance includes financing 
from domestic as well as foreign banks.  Development bank includes funding from both development and public sector banks.  Informal 
includes funding from money lenders and traditional or informal sources. GOVERNMENT and FOREIGN are dummy variables indicating 
whether a firm has government or foreign ownership, respectively; EXPORTER is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is an 
exporting firm; SUBSIDIZED is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives subsidies from the national or local authorities; 
MANUFACTURING is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is in the manufacturing sector; SERVICES is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a firm is in the services sector; FIRM GROWTH is firm sales growth; SMALL is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
firm size is small; MEDIUM is a dummy variable that indicates whether firm size is medium; CORPORATION is  a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a firm is incorporated; and FINANCING OBSTACLE is an index that measures how problematic financing is to the 
operation and growth of a business and ranges from no obstacle (1), to minor obstacle (2), to moderate obstacle (3), to major obstacle (4).  
Country-level control variables GDP PER CAPITA is real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in US dollars; INFLATION is the log 
difference of the Consumer Price Index (CPI); GROWTH is the average annual growth rate of GDP in US dollars; PRIVATE CREDIT is the 
financial institutions’ credit to the private sector divided by GDP; VALUE TRADED is the value of shares traded on the stock exchange to 
GDP; and PROPERTY RIGHTS is a rating from one to five of the degree to which property rights are protected in a nation. Variable 
definitions and sources are detailed in the Appendix.  All regressions are run as tobit regressions with error terms clustered at the country 
level. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *= significant at 5%; **= significant at 1%. 
Variable External 
Finance 
Bank Equity Lease Supplier 
Credit 
Development 
Bank 
Informal 
Panel A. Private Credit      
GOVERNMENT 3.999 -2.752 13.938 -4.236 -2.283 14.844 11.541 
 [6.720] [4.897] [8.792] [6.229] [4.822] [9.252] [6.369] 
FOREIGN -1.009 -2.568 15.01 -11.53 -5.524 5.765 -1.893 
 [4.060] [3.693] [5.330]** [4.077]** [3.259] [5.609] [9.224] 
EXPORTER 9.483 8.008 5.619 10.448 5.738 -3.709 -0.779 
 [3.143]** [2.685]** [5.191] [3.197]** [2.658]* [4.254] [5.418] 
SUBSIDIZED 7.95 1.345 -1.462 6.687 -2.078 34.823 -1.455 
 [4.510] [4.713] [7.306] [4.421] [3.403] [5.412]** [7.447] 
MANUFACTURING 3.19 10.398 -18.741 -1.572 6.755 -6.149 -3.226 
 [5.463] [5.083]* [9.664] [3.811] [4.485] [7.867] [6.031] 
SERVICES 2.225 1.809 -6.6 10.324 4.604 -8.901 -0.011 
 [5.020] [5.440] [6.362] [4.226]* [4.715] [7.202] [6.470] 
FIRM GROWTH 4.756 0.353 9.227 3.437 1.456 5.694 0.689 
 [3.023] [2.650] [3.360]** [2.068] [1.640] [2.733]* [2.563] 
SMALL -29.2 -35.079 2.602 3.03 -5.796 -13.425 26.687 
 [5.012]** [4.784]** [7.580] [4.870] [4.177] [7.210] [8.891]** 
MEDIUM -9.711 -14.915 1.26 6.876 2.712 2.76 19.242 
 [3.661]** [3.352]** [6.963] [3.549] [2.866] [5.346] [8.017]* 
CORPORATION -5.665 -2.994 2.621 3.425 -0.59 1.852 -1.531 
 [4.318] [3.683] [8.969] [3.306] [3.045] [4.492] [4.097] 
FINANCING  5.207 4.016 0.979 2.325 2.571 4.823 8.71 
OBSTACLE [1.663]** [1.693]* [2.752] [1.484] [1.143]* [1.872]** [2.026]** 
INFLATION -39.386 -52.784 26.123 29.221 -37.946 41.914 -9.078 
 [20.531] [18.909]** [45.534] [21.749] [15.617]* [16.703]* [30.984] 
GROWTH 123.933 -31.285 448.666 224.575 -74.687 111.301 168.238 
 [146.610] [102.590] [344.334] [129.133] [91.115] [85.205] [155.595] 
GDP PER CAPITA 4.643 4.645 14.44 4.155 -0.186 -1.322 -0.275 
 [3.153] [2.387] [4.324]** [1.940]* [2.142] [3.027] [3.619] 
PRIVATE CREDIT 3.014 2.467 -1.348 3.865 1.24 7.622 0.335 
 [1.501]* [1.958] [3.829] [1.924]* [1.081] [1.863]** [1.592] 
Constant -1.749 -27.29 -209.293 -103.944 -33.254 -75.254 -128.933 
 [29.044] [23.129] [40.623]** [22.992]** [20.130] [25.930]** [35.791]** 
        
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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Panel B. Value Traded       
GOVERNMENT 1.719 -4.975 16.327 -5.576 -3.454 11.363 11.638 
 [6.181] [4.765] [8.669] [5.942] [4.843] [9.483] [6.818] 
FOREIGN -0.276 -1.811 14.115 -11.618 -4.876 7.216 -2.746 
 [4.168] [3.716] [5.984]* [3.879]** [3.148] [5.581] [8.766] 
EXPORTER 8.888 7.649 5.345 9.785 5.583 -4.883 -0.829 
 [3.124]** [2.554]** [5.018] [3.043]** [2.557]* [4.361] [5.396] 
SUBSIDIZED 8.221 2.221 -3.352 6.197 -1.116 35.658 -2.109 
 [4.476] [4.696] [7.162] [4.513] [3.413] [5.519]** [7.561] 
MANUFACTURING 3.683 10.58 -19.162 -1.199 6.774 -4.689 -3.108 
 [5.689] [5.047]* [9.440]* [3.923] [4.392] [7.999] [6.109] 
SERVICES 2.15 1.854 -7.619 9.511 4.805 -8.178 -0.193 
 [5.224] [5.406] [6.287] [4.458]* [4.647] [7.252] [6.550] 
FIRM GROWTH 4.714 0.354 8.325 3.173 1.417 5.305 0.675 
 [3.022] [2.667] [3.068]** [2.161] [1.703] [2.644]* [2.586] 
SMALL -30.555 -35.026 -0.647 -0.89 -4.882 -15.399 25.373 
 [4.908]** [4.703]** [7.454] [4.398] [3.993] [7.091]* [9.349]** 
MEDIUM -11.009 -15.135 -0.871 3.494 3.247 0.324 18.302 
 [3.405]** [3.274]** [6.980] [3.380] [2.735] [5.065] [8.254]* 
CORPORATION -7.099 -3.558 1.528 1.384 -0.479 -0.739 -1.947 
 [4.278] [4.097] [8.652] [2.816] [3.068] [4.290] [4.363] 
FINANCING OBST. 5.056 3.82 1.094 2.321 2.409 4.494 8.651 
 [1.669]** [1.715]* [2.706] [1.387] [1.103]* [1.858]* [1.941]** 
INFLATION -42.612 -60.769 48.358 40.521 -46.445 29.584 -0.068 
 [20.641]* [22.443]** [32.741] [16.536]* [12.966]** [17.808] [32.069] 
GROWTH 129.24 -52.057 514.998 256.508 -100.88 119.554 179.565 
 [147.876] [115.425] [344.525] [92.810]** [80.581] [79.700] [142.583] 
GDP PER CAPITA 4.782 6.823 6.219 -0.114 2.46 0.494 -2.849 
 [3.390] [2.530]** [5.728] [2.153] [2.345] [2.944] [3.998] 
VALUE TRADED 0.897 -0.779 5.85 5.125 -1.485 0.99 2.214 
 [1.302] [1.113] [2.330]* [0.973]** [0.873] [0.967] [1.379] 
Constant -1.563 -49.61 -118.309 -53.506 -61.242 -92.852 -99.744 
 [32.482] [24.104]* [55.061]* [25.224]* [23.254]** [25.519]** [41.004]* 
        
Number of 
observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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Panel C. Property Rights 
 
GOVERNMENT 4.784 -2.575 20.769 -5.694 -2.444 11.95 10.452 
 [5.826] [5.292] [8.208]* [6.588] [5.214] [9.289] [6.525] 
FOREIGN 0.116 -1.925 15.41 -10.71 -5.029 7.363 -1.971 
 [4.015] [3.831] [5.323]** [3.967]** [3.148] [5.528] [9.510] 
EXPORTER 8.6 7.28 5.343 9.779 5.354 -4.849 -0.835 
 [3.075]*
* [2.698]** [4.619] [3.341]** [2.555]* [4.372] [5.396] 
SUBSIDIZED 7.692 1.215 -3.128 6.994 -2.032 35.732 -1.09 
 [4.523] [4.768] [7.177] [4.432] [3.376] [5.416]** [7.456] 
MANUFACTURING 5.091 11.697 -15.797 -0.63 7.288 -4.264 -3.497 
 [5.446] [5.174]* [9.085] [3.906] [4.525] [7.991] [6.004] 
SERVICES 3.127 2.382 -4.468 10.642 4.828 -7.841 -0.2 
 [5.219] [5.582] [5.995] [4.224]* [4.758] [7.204] [6.509] 
FIRM GROWTH 4.504 0.106 8.013 3.297 1.361 5.222 0.734 
 [2.982] [2.616] [3.139]* [2.100] [1.637] [2.656]* [2.532] 
SMALL -31.266 -36.722 0.919 2.011 -6.582 -15.164 26.848 
 [4.915]*
* [4.881]** [7.246] [4.681] [4.113] [7.107]* [9.048]** 
MEDIUM -11.268 -16.101 1.099 5.842 2.151 0.543 19.227 
 [3.617]*
* [3.341]** [6.705] [3.495] [2.802] [5.168] [8.132]* 
CORPORATION -7.702 -4.515 1.987 2.334 -1.378 -0.851 -1.49 
 [3.960] [3.860] [8.297] [3.274] [2.892] [4.432] [4.112] 
FINANCING  5.412 4.115 1.627 2.435 2.571 4.606 8.57 
OBSTACLE [1.629]*
* [1.684]* [2.207] [1.449] [1.148]* [1.802]* [2.066]** 
INFLATION -43.24 -56.832 32.211 21.067 -39.871 25.54 -10.307 
 [18.857]
* [15.988]** [38.517] [21.637] [16.453]* [15.942] [30.550] 
GROWTH 137.941 -24.544 459.823 207.452 -71.207 111.693 161.361 
 [138.361
] [110.738] [310.342] [130.425] [92.530] [81.921] [156.654] 
GDP PER CAPITA 0.211 1.608 1.719 4.447 -1.194 -0.169 1.208 
 [3.638] [2.862] [5.842] [3.100] [2.659] [3.081] [3.715] 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 11.018 7.861 23.123 3.114 3.035 3.618 -2.49 
 [3.226]*
* [3.262]* [8.483]** [4.181] [3.465] [4.398] [4.255] 
Constant -7.642 -32.363 -187.957 -120.977 -36.755 -104.105 -131.962 
 [28.867] [22.528] [34.739]** [24.618]** [19.115] [28.769]** [33.757]** 
        
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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   Panel D. Private credit, value traded and property rights 
GOVERNMENT 5.734 -1.000 17.034 -5.942 -1.162 14.961 9.658 
 [6.266] [4.709] [7.638]* [5.934] [4.685] [9.308] [6.889] 
FOREIGN -0.247 -2.111 17.259 -11.956 -4.978 5.813 -3.317 
 [3.803] [3.562] [5.357]** [4.026]** [3.112] [5.525] [8.497] 
EXPORTER 8.885 7.678 3.534 10.039 5.806 -3.732 -0.815 
 [3.074]** [2.619]** [4.496] [3.049]** [2.544]* [4.304] [5.343] 
SUBSIDIZED 7.571 1.699 -2.655 6.202 -1.467 34.811 -1.67 
 [4.444] [4.713] [6.760] [4.517] [3.376] [5.453]** [7.540] 
MANUFACTURING 4.808 11.354 -15.409 -1.768 7.057 -6.06 -3.726 
 [5.205] [5.005]* [8.831] [3.921] [4.283] [7.908] [6.314] 
SERVICES 3.117 2.627 -5.692 9.214 5.218 -8.867 -0.611 
 [5.130] [5.363] [5.912] [4.343]* [4.544] [7.195] [6.502] 
FIRM GROWTH 4.531 0.163 7.06 3.289 1.387 5.671 0.767 
 [2.972] [2.612] [2.988]* [2.197] [1.740] [2.700]* [2.538] 
SMALL -30.633 -34.917 -3.292 -0.569 -4.714 -13.471 25.502 
 [5.024]** [4.764]** [6.961] [4.342] [4.008] [7.282] [9.150]** 
MEDIUM -10.671 -14.602 -2.907 3.755 3.714 2.723 18.194 
 [3.596]** [3.177]** [6.763] [3.511] [2.848] [5.344] [8.281]* 
CORPORATION -7.02 -3.079 -1.17 1.836 -0.205 1.765 -1.709 
 [4.262] [3.613] [8.026] [2.910] [3.157] [4.641] [3.883] 
FINANCING 
OBSTACLE 5.469 4.216 1.447 2.146 2.656 4.841 8.341 
 [1.609]** [1.656]* [2.245] [1.268] [1.148]* [1.854]** [2.000]** 
INFLATION -41.576 -58.34 32.008 43.323 -43.928 41.637 0.518 
 [19.780]* [22.068]** [31.715] [16.772]** [11.975]** [17.094]* [32.533] 
GROWTH 135.581 -45.273 451.195 262.617 -98.633 111.652 169.584 
 [138.443] [114.610] [254.513] [95.628]** [80.500] [84.081] [141.384] 
GDP PER CAPITA 0.276 2.879 0.068 0.812 0.391 -1.598 -0.594 
 [3.457] [2.764] [5.628] [2.669] [2.675] [2.539] [3.808] 
PRIVATE CREDIT 1.408 1.823 -8.478 0.999 1.502 7.568 -0.385 
 [2.001] [2.431] [4.228]* [2.550] [1.054] [2.112]** [1.695] 
VALUE TRADED -0.346 -1.919 4.9 5.277 -2.127 -0.054 2.767 
 [1.301] [0.990] [2.086]* [1.156]** [0.904]* [0.982] [1.442] 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 10.578 8.888 23.12 -3.187 4.451 0.676 -5.214 
 [4.278]* [3.723]* [8.924]** [3.581] [3.521] [3.889] [4.776] 
Constant -6.906 -52.787 -161.862 -47.953 -62.073 -75.682 -96.866 
 [28.474] [22.070]* [42.152]** [25.310] [21.851]** [23.132]** [39.232]* 
        
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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Table 6 
 
Determinants of financing patterns, interaction effects. The estimated fixed-effects interval regression model is FINANCING SOURCE = α0 + α1 GOVERNMENT + α2 FOREIGN + α3 
EXPORTER + α4 SUBSIDIZED + α5 MANUFACTURING + α6 SERVICES + α7 FIRM GROWTH + α8 SMALL + α9 MEDIUM + α10 CORPORATION + α11 FINANCING OBSTACLE +  
α12 INTERACTION TERMS  ε. FINANCING SOURCE is the proportion of investment financed by external sources, bank debt, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development banks, or  
informal sources. Bank finance includes financing from domestic as well as foreign banks.  Development bank includes funding from both development and public sector banks.  Informal 
includes funding from money lenders and traditional or informal sources.  GOVERNMENT and FOREIGN are dummy variables indicating whether a firm has government or foreign 
ownership, respectively; EXPORTER is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is an exporting firm; SUBSIDIZED is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm receives subsidies 
from the national or local authorities; MANUFACTURING is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is in the manufacturing sector; SERVICES is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a firm is in the services sector; FIRM GROWTH is firm sales growth; SMALL is a dummy variable that indicates whether firm size is small; MEDIUM is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether firm size is medium; CORPORATION is  a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is incorporated; and FINANCING OBSTACLE is an index that measures how 
problematic financing is to the operation and growth of a business and ranges from no obstacle (1), to minor obstacle (2), to moderate obstacle (3), to major obstacle (4). PRIVATE CREDIT is 
the financial institutions’ credit to the private sector divided by gross domestic product (GDP); VALUE TRADED is the value of shares traded on the stock exchange to GDP; and PROPERTY 
RIGHTS is a rating from one to five of the degree to which property rights are protected in a nation. Country-level variables are averaged over 1995-1999.  Variable definitions and sources are 
detailed in the Appendix. All regressions are run as tobit regressions and include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets;*= significant at 5%; **= significant at 1%. 
 
 
Variable External 
Finance 
Bank Equity Lease Supplier Credit Development Bank Informal 
Panel A. Private Credit 
 
     
SMALL -7.057 -9.331 5.831 15.825 6.526 9.107 55.471 
 [9.663] [8.458] [13.053] [9.842] [8.608] [14.991] [22.036]* 
MEDIUM -4.262 -4.445 -14.098 6.09 18.801 -13.084 43.98 
 [8.912] [7.824] [12.432] [9.439] [7.947]* [13.304] [22.046]* 
PRIVATE CREDIT * SMALL 2.535 3.451 -3.641 7.722 3.348 11.727 -7.222 
 [2.266] [1.796] [3.798] [3.608]* [2.004] [5.482]* [3.194]* 
PRIVATE CREDIT * MEDIUM 0.907 1.728 -2.654 2.728 2.26 6.741 -1.951 
 [1.678] [1.602] [2.900] [2.845] [1.637] [4.344] [3.759] 
PRIVATE CREDIT * LARGE 5.046 6.15 1.62 4.326 3.919 13.163 5.52 
 [2.490]* [2.132]** [5.802] [3.458] [2.415] [5.774]* [7.424] 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * SMALL 3.856 2.128 -1.335 -0.1 2.757 -2.14 4.029 
 [1.913]* [1.760] [2.840] [1.706] [1.775] [3.287] [2.830] 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * MEDIUM 6.863 4.758 6.229 3.06 0.315 7.3 10.472 
 [1.772]** [1.613]** [2.835]* [1.733] [1.609] [2.779]** [3.134]** 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * LARGE 10.125 8.996 6.294 6.562 5.981 5.032 21.831 
 [2.503]** [2.263]** [3.689] [3.193]* [2.260]** [3.501] [5.909]** 
Constant 17.17 7.448 -104.856 -78.403 -38.842 -77.059 -166.771 
 [11.924] [10.595] [20.313]** [16.690]** [10.671]** [20.156]** [30.106]** 
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 
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Panel B. Value Traded 
 
       
SMALL -2.925 -6.84 7.014 16.009 8.481 10.778 48.825 
 [9.873] [8.707] [13.352] [9.849] [8.901] [15.240] [20.486]* 
MEDIUM -4.262 -4.149 -16.892 3.481 18.696 -9.063 36.52 
 [9.226] [8.118] [12.891] [9.589] [8.517]* [13.733] [20.952] 
VALUE TRADED * SMALL 0.487 1.082 -9.337 27.404 3.06 2.299 33.262 
 [2.820] [2.017] [4.073]* [2.640]** [2.678] [5.256] [0.000] 
VALUE TRADED * MEDIUM -1.745 -0.411 -10.796 23.482 1.868 1.463 35.341 
 [2.832] [2.026] [3.976]** [0.000] [2.656] [5.334] [0.000] 
VALUE TRADED * LARGE -0.593 0.607 -8.061 25.52 2.344 1.558 38.694 
 [2.917] [2.111] [4.301] [2.625]** [2.755] [5.392] [4.431]** 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * SMALL 4.297 2.403 -1.014 0.302 2.985 -2.099 3.84 
 [1.930]* [1.779] [2.882] [1.729] [1.828] [3.343] [2.848] 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * MEDIUM 6.679 4.779 5.782 2.711 0.215 7.907 10.354 
 [1.764]** [1.608]** [2.804]* [1.679] [1.597] [2.809]** [3.084]** 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * LARGE 9.449 8.378 6.231 6.75 5.684 4.22 20.78 
 [2.513]** [2.254]** [3.544] [3.164]* [2.210]* [3.423] [6.343]** 
Constant 9.505 2 -131.271 -5.689 -36.811 -89.817 -45.85 
 [15.629] [12.924] [25.884]** [17.135] [14.104]** [26.912]** [28.651] 
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 
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Panel C. Property Rights 
 
       
SMALL -37.507 -35.95 -2.732 25.142 -20.308 4.729 70.015 
 [17.162]* [15.069]* [28.142] [23.190] [16.769] [26.885] [33.810]* 
MEDIUM 7.98 -5.352 22.654 34.417 18.355 -1.506 56.67 
 [16.307] [14.559] [27.473] [22.362] [14.609] [24.628] [33.745] 
PROPERTY RIGHTS * SMALL 17.368 17.06 15.881 5.679 13.779 -12.722 6.296 
 [4.466]** [3.916]** [9.867] [6.156] [4.659]** [7.248] [8.881] 
PROPERTY RIGHTS * MEDIUM 7.057 11.067 4.712 2.326 7.378 -15.592 5.167 
 [4.102] [3.573]** [9.800] [6.195] [4.082] [6.366]* [9.314] 
PROPERTY RIGHTS * LARGE 9.292 9.936 12.975 8.774 6.879 -13.748 7.945 
 [4.226]* [3.598]** [9.714] [6.468] [4.229] [7.227] [9.984] 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * SMALL 4.72 2.723 -0.683 -0.155 3.188 -2.114 4.338 
 [1.937]* [1.772] [2.893] [1.729] [1.832] [3.283] [2.926] 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * MEDIUM 6.382 4.791 5.167 2.962 0.043 7.774 9.802 
 [1.778]** [1.628]** [2.798] [1.730] [1.599] [2.804]** [3.019]** 
FINANCING OBSTACLE * LARGE 8.998 7.77 5.683 7.42 5.192 4.366 19.851 
 [2.509]** [2.229]** [3.493] [3.325]* [2.202]* [3.401] [5.789]** 
Constant -25.699 -39.869 -155.191 -120.924 -71.588 -39.655 -196.866 
 [16.766] [14.530]** [37.962]** [28.053]** [16.705]** [26.093] [43.178]** 
Number of observations 2,734 2,734 2,734 2,734 2734 2734 2734 
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Table A1 Appendix 
 
Number of firms in each country and size group. The data source is the World Business Environment Survey. A firm is defined as 
small if it has between five and 50 employees, medium size if it has between 51 and five hundred employees, and large if it has more 
than five hundred employees. 
Country 
Total number 
 of firms 
Number of 
 small firms 
Number of 
 medium firms 
Number of 
 large firms 
Argentina 73 23 32 18 
Armenia 74 49 21 4 
Belarus 78 22 48 8 
Belize 14 7 6 1 
Bolivia 62 21 21 20 
Brazil 112 14 79 19 
Bulgaria 87 49 31 7 
Canada 56 14 30 12 
Chile 65 23 20 22 
China 54 26 16 12 
Colombia 76 13 24 39 
Costa Rica 48 13 18 17 
Croatia 81 18 45 18 
Czech Republic 68 43 18 7 
Dominican Republic 62 11 23 28 
El Salvador 37 11 12 14 
Estonia 98 44 44 10 
France 33 8 18 7 
Germany 31 9 18 4 
Guatemala 32 10 12 10 
Haiti 42 14 15 13 
Honduras 30 15 8 7 
Hungary 79 46 25 8 
Indonesia 30 12 12 6 
Italy 24 4 11 9 
Lithuania 62 49 11 2 
Malaysia 21 10 6 5 
Mexico 30 10 13 7 
Moldova 72 24 40 8 
Nicaragua 44 22 11 11 
Pakistan 24 8 13 3 
Panama 41 5 13 23 
Peru 40 12 13 15 
Philippines 69 20 37 12 
Poland 163 65 81 17 
Romania 88 53 28 7 
Singapore 64 28 17 19 
Slovak Republic 77 46 28 3 
Slovenia 96 26 61 9 
Spain 45 15 26 4 
Sweden 67 29 27 11 
Trinidad and Tobago 55 21 24 10 
Turkey 103 40 50 13 
Ukraine 164 75 72 17 
United Kingdom 43 24 17 2 
United States 34 17 9 8 
Uruguay 47 7 25 15 
Venezuela 40 15 8 17 
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 Variables and sources. Table A2  
   
Variable Definition Original source 
Growth Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in current US dollars, average 
1995-1999 
World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita Real per capita GDP, average 1995-99 World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate Log difference of Consumer Price Index, average 1995-1999 International Financial Statistics, line 
64 
Private Credit {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)], where F is credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private 
sector (lines 22d + 42d), GDP is line 99b, P_e is end of period CPI (line 
64), and P_a is the average CPI for the year 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000) 
Value Traded The value of shares traded divided by GDP, average 1995-1999 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000) 
Property Rights An index from 1 (less) to 5 (more) measuring the degree to which 
property rights are protected in an economy, averaged over 1995-1999  
Heritage Foundation 
   
Firm Growth Estimate of the firm's sales growth over the past three years World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
Government Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any government agency 
or state body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, and zero 
otherwise 
WBES 
Foreign Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign company or 
individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, and zero 
otherwise 
WBES 
Exporter Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, and zero 
otherwise 
WBES 
Subsidized Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm receives subsidies 
(including tolerance of tax arrears) from local or national government 
and zero otherwise 
WBES 
Manufacturing Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the 
manufacturing industry, and zero otherwise 
WBES 
Services Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the service 
industry, and zero otherwise 
WBES 
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Firm size A firm is defined as small if it has between five and 50 employees, 
medium size if it has between 51 and five hundred employees and large 
if it has more than five hundred employees. Size is a vector of dummy 
variables, small, medium and large,  that indicate firm size. Small (or 
medium or large) takes  the value one if a firm is small (or medium or 
large) and zero otherwise 
WBES 
Financing Obstacle How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business:  no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3), 
or a major obstacle (4)? 
 WBES 
   
Equity finance Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
equity, sale of stocks 
WBES 
Bank finance Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
local and foreign commercial banks 
WBES 
Leasing finance Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
leasing arrangements 
WBES 
Supplier finance Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
supplier credit arrangements 
WBES 
Development finance Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
development and public sector banks 
WBES 
Informal finance Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
informal money lenders 
WBES 
External finance Bank finance + equity finance + leasing finance + supplier finance + 
development finance + informal finance 
WBES 
 
 
 
 
 
